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Abstract: The motivation for this research is to explore the success behind the Oakland based
Family Independence Initiative (FII) as a model for poverty alleviation. During the period of
June-December 2012, nearly 200 small business owners in Medellin, Colombia participated in a
field experiment intended to replicate the FII model by randomizing the treatments of setting
goals, receiving conditional payments, and participating in self-help groups, as well as the
combinations thereof. The data shows that the subjects in the full FII treatment group achieve
more goals and have significantly higher monthly sales than those subjects in any other
treatment or control group. Given its success, this research explores the merits of a change in
subjects’ time preferences as a mechanism explaining the changes in behavior caused by
participation in the FII program. The subjects’ time preferences were measured via survey using
a combination of the binary choice and fill-in-the-blank methods on three different occasions
throughout the experiment. The data indicates that participating in the FII experiment does
indeed change subject’s time preferences, suggesting they become more patient and less presentbiased over time. Examining how time preferences can change over time is particularly useful
when discussing poverty alleviation, as inter-temporal choices affect a range of behaviors such as
saving, borrowing, and various types of investment, all of which affect economic well-being.
The author wishes to thank the Mayor’s Office of Medellin, Colombia, in particular El Banco de las Oportunidades,
for their partnership in the FII experiment. Thank you to our gracious host family, the enumerators, and the
participants, without whom this project would not have been possible. A very special thank you goes out to the
members of Team Colombia and our adviser.

1. Introduction
The Family Independence Initiative (FII) began in Oakland, California in 2001
implementing a new and innovative poverty reduction program. The program has since spread
to cities around the United States, including Boston, San Francisco, and Honolulu. The FII
shows findings that suggest it is possible to reduce poverty by focusing on the notion of goal
achievement accompanied by small financial incentives and group support. The FII organizes
affinity groups made up of low income families of different cultural backgrounds within a
geographical area, provides them with some helpful tools to succeed in attaining self-set goals,
and offers an incentive to motivate continued progress in achieving their goals (Castuera et al
2004). The program aims to act as a bottom-up approach, as it emphasizes family ties and social
networks over the assistance of professional staff (Miller, 2011). The organization’s internal
reports show substantial improvements in welfare in all program locations. The FII states that
the participants have experienced a 23 percent increase in average household income, a 240
percent increase in average savings, a 17 percent increase in home ownership, and as well as
increases in children’s school grades and attendance rates (Miller, 2011; Castuera et al 2004).
Encouraging accountability, empowerment, and self-starter attitudes seems to have an effect on
the participants’ behaviors. This indicates that psychological motivators and indicators could
have an important relationship with economic outcomes, and therefore substantial implications
for economic development policy both domestically and abroad.
Given the apparent success of the FII model, a field experiment was conducted in
Medellin, Colombia in June through December 2012 with the goal of exploring the possible
reasons for the FII accomplishments. The primary purpose of the FII experiment in Medellin
was to assess whether the FII framework is indicative of a successful poverty alleviation model
that can be applied more generally, or whether the success can be attributed to other unknown
factors or circumstances specific to the areas in which the program has already been
implemented. More specifically, the FII experiment aimed to assess the extent to which each
one of the FII components – setting goals, being involved in self-support groups, and receiving
small economic incentives based on achievement – contributed to the behaviors of participating
individuals.
The experimental data from the FII experiment conducted in Medellin not only show
that subjects in the FII treatment group were more likely to achieve their goals, but provide
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some evidence that the FII subjects’ businesses experienced higher revenues due to the
experiment as well. However, these findings are not the focus of this research. Now that it is
known that FII experiment had a statistically significant impact on the subjects, the next step
is to assess the potential causes of these behavior changes. The objective of this particular
research is to understand through which mechanisms the subjects’ attitudes and behaviors were
affected. While there could be a multitude of factors that affected goal achievement and
revenues (or lack thereof) among the subjects of this study, this paper will focus on the
relationship between participating in the FII experiment and changes in the subjects’ time
preferences.
Economists have long recognized that people’s perception of time affects how they
evaluate many decisions in their lives, ranging from economic decisions to decisions about
health care (Wilson, 2011; Robberstad & Cairns, 2007). It can even affect how one treats the
natural environment (Kirby et al., 2002). Examining these relationships is particularly useful
when discussing models for poverty alleviation, as inter-temporal choices affect a range of
behaviors such as saving, borrowing, and various types of investment (including in education
and health care), all of which affect economic well-being (Anderson et al., 2004; Camilo et al.,
2008). Because economic development in general is related to time preference, questions now
arise as to whether or not a person can become more patient, perhaps engendering better
economic outcomes. This research adds to the growing amount of literature that explores if
various measurements of time preferences can change over time, and if so, how this occurs.
Thus the following two research questions are explored:
(1) To what extent does participating in the FII experiment affect measures of the
subjects’ discount rates?
(2) To what extent does participating in the FII experiment affect measures of the
subjects’ present bias?
The findings of this paper illustrate that the subjects in the treatment group
representing the full FII model did not become more patient, but did exhibit significantly lower
estimations of present-bias over time as compared to the other treatment and control groups.
The rest of this paper is organized in the following manner. Section 2 reviews the relevant
literature on time preferences, economic development, and goal setting. Section 3 examines the
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sample and methodology. Section 4 discusses the models, hypotheses, and data analysis for the
two research questions respectively. And finally, the results, policy implications, and
conclusions will be presented in Section 5.

2. Literature Review
This section reviews the literature to see what evidence exists to indicate whether or
not a program like FII could impact participants’ time preferences. It examines specifically
measurements of present bias and discount rates. While the majority of academics agree that
time preferences are important factors in decision-making and economic development, there is
some contention in the field as to the nature of that relationship. To fully explore all of the
components and previous findings associated with this research, the literature review has been
divided into four broad topics. First, the theoretical background on time preferences is
reviewed. Next, the literature on present bias and discount rates and their respective
associations with economic outcomes will be discussed, in that order. And finally, the literature
review concludes by remarking on the findings regarding the relationship specifically between
the various components of the FII model – goals, groups, and incentives – and time preferences.
2.1 Theoretical Modeling of Time Preferences
Since the seminal works of Irving Fisher (1930) and Paul Samuelson (1937), economists
have given a lot of explanatory power to time preferences as drivers for individuals decisionmaking. Their initial theoretical work involving time preferences came about within the
context of utility maximization across time periods. It was noted by Samuelson that
consumption in a future time period is not as valuable as consumption in the current time
period (1937). In his models of constant discounted utility, Samuelson accounts for these
differences in preferences across time by incorporating an exponential discounting function that
discounts the value of consumption in future periods by a constant parameter, the discount rate.
This work led to what is seen as the traditional form of discounting, the exponential
discounting model (Hausman, 1979). One of the assumptions of this model is that the marginal
rate of substitution between two periods only depends on their distance apart in time. In other
words, the exponential discounting model assumes that discount rates are dynamically
consistent, where the valuation falls by a constant factor each day regardless of how far into the
future one looks (Hausman, 1979). This implies that the only difference across individuals is
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equal to the differences in actual borrowing or lending rates and also that the discount rates for
the same people across time remain constant (Fisher, 1930).
Unfortunately, the majority of the empirical findings suggest that the assumptions
about time preferences within the exponential discounting model do not hold up in real life
(Luhmann, 2013; Rohde, 2010;). Herrnstein was one of the first to suggest that time
preferences could vary over time, stating that the subjective value of consumption in the future
is likely inversely related to the length of the delay (Chung & Herrnstein, 1967). Richard
Thaler (1981) was one of the first to present experimental evidence to the contrary of the
exponential discounting model. In his experiment, subjects were asked to write down the
amount that would make him or her indifferent to receiving a hypothetical lottery prize now or
at a specified time in the future. The delay times ranged from three months to ten years.
Thaler’s results suggest that discount rates are not constant over time, and that they are
negatively correlated with the length of the delay (1981). The works of Herrnstein and Thaler,
along with others, inspired an alternative type of discounting, the hyperbolic discount model.
With hyperbolic discounting, consumption over future time periods is discounted by a
hyperbolic discount function. Mathematically, this allows for results similar to Thaler’s where
the valuation falls quickly for a short delay period and more slowly for long delay periods, i.e.
the discount rate is higher for a shorter delay period than for a longer delay period.
2.2 Present Bias Literature
In his recent research comparing hyperbolic and exponential discounting models,
Christian Luhmann states that the majority of studies that have looked for evidence of
hyperbolic discount functions have at least found the existence present bias (2013). In other
words, according to Luhmann, most empirical studies have found that preferences do shift in
the direction expected under hyperbolic discounting, regardless of whether or not the absolute
values of the discount rates properly fit the exact function (Luhmann 2013). This is an
important point for this research. While the research questions listed in the introduction of this
paper are not specifically interested in identifying the exact shape of the subjects’ discount
function, the assumptions about the shape of the function come into play when assessing
present bias. Thus, it is useful to examine the empirical comparisons of the models because
discussing the fit of the models demonstrates what others have found in the way of discount
rates as a function of delay time, which gives some indication of the existence of present bias in
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general. In other words, exponential discounting models do not allow for present bias, whereas
hyperbolic discounting models do. This is because individuals with a hyperbolic discount
function are more patient in the near future and grow more patient as the delayed rewards get
further and further away, which is essentially the definition of present bias (Luhmann, 2013).
Since Herrnstein and Thaler’s works, many economists have done research comparing
the exponential discounting model to hyperbolic discounting model, and the results are
somewhat mixed, although they do tend to favor the hyperbolic discounting model or one of it’s
adaptations. The model comparison is often done by using structural estimation techniques and
comparing which model best fits the data. Exponential discounting is most commonly used
theoretical modeling, which makes sense because a similar equation is used by banks to
calculate compound interest. Glenn Harrison and his colleagues confirm its topicality when
they show no evidence of discount rates changing over time when conducting a time preference
experiment on Danes, although several scholars – the authors included – have noted that Danes
might not be a very representative subject pool (Harrison et al., 2002; Harrison et al, 2004).
Additionally Anderson, et al. (2004) find evidence from survey and experimental data collected
in Vietnam that the discount rates vary over variables other than time, such as age and gender.
These studies imply that no present bias existed among their subjects.
Many economists have found evidence that the hyperbolic discounting model better fits
their empirical data. Tanaka, Camerer, and Nguyen (2010) find support for the hyperbolic
discounting model when using survey and experimental data in Vietnam. Bauyer and Chytilova
(2010) find similar support in their experimental data from Uganda. Burks and his colleagues
(2011) compare four different models of time preferences and find that the quasi-hyperbolic
model outperforms the rest, due to the extensive present-bias found in the data. Additionally
Luhmann finds that when allowing for various front-end delays in his experiment with
American college students his data is most consistent with the hyperbolic discounting model,
although it is not a great fit. Due to this he concludes that individuals’ preferences do exhibit
present-bias, but not as much as indicated by hyperbolic discounting models, which is a
common finding among the experimental research (2013). The hyperbolic shape of all of the
data collected in the aforementioned experiments allows for the assumption that present bias
existed among their subjects at the time of the experiments.
As previously mentioned, this paper’s goal is not to extract which discount function best
describes the subjects in the FII experiment, but rather to assess to what extent present bias
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exists within the subjects and how that changes over time. The following studies focus on the
existence of present bias itself rather than the shape of the discount function, much like this
study does. It is useful to examine present bias, because it is associated with undesirable
behaviors, such as procrastination, lack of savings, and a higher probability of quitting their job
(Burks et al., 2011). People with present bias tend to be impatient today and delay undesirable
tasks to the future, where they imagine themselves to be much more patient (Rohde, 2010).
However, when the future becomes today, the cycle starts all over. For example, Michal Bauer
and his colleagues perform a similar study to the FII experiment, except it was conducted in
rural India. They use the binary choice method to elicit both the subjects’ discount rates and
measures of present bias (Bauer et al 2012). They consider a subject to be present biased if their
indifference point in the future choice is at least two choices later than the indifference point in
the contemporary choice. They find that people with present bias tend to borrow more to make
up for low levels of savings, even after controlling for measures of patience. When regressing
present bias on other observables factors, they find no observable or behavioral explanation for
the existence of present bias in their subjects (Bauer et al., 2012). Tanaka et al. (2010)
structurally estimate a present bias parameter based on a 75 binary choice protocol in rural
Vietnam and also do not find any of their observables offer any explanatory power. However,
Burks et al. (2011) do find that cognitive ability is correlated with lower present bias, although
this is merely an association. It is important to keep in mind, that while these correlations are
important and informative, they are only correlations. For example, Bauer and his colleagues
did not utilize any econometric technique in order to claim a true causal effect in their
interpretation, and simply discuss the results as “associations” (2012). Overall, there is evidence
that present bias is an indicator of certain behaviors, but there seems to be a gap in literature in
terms of causal determinants of present bias or the changes therein.
2.3 Discount Rates Literature
In addition to establishing the shape of individuals’ discount functions, researching the
relationship between time preferences and behavioral outcomes is an important aspect of
behavioral and development economics. Although an extensive amount of literature has been
written about time discounting, much of it has been based on laboratory experiments done in
developed countries; namely the work of Glenn Harrison in Denmark and Uwe Sunde in
Germany have been significant contributions (Bauer et al, 2012). However, there are also
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several studies that have conducted field experiments outside of the lab in developing countries
in order to study subjects’ behavioral choices. These are more in line with the FII experiment
in Medellin. The results of some of these experiments will be discussed below. As development
economists, these results are important because they have the potential to provide not only
descriptive power in terms of why certain people are poor and others are rich, but also can
implicate specific policy options as preferable over others.
Through the use of survey and experimental data collection, there has been a wide
variety of research conducted that aims to assess the role of discount rates in individuals’
decision-making. However, this evidence is mixed. There is a lack of consensus in terms
magnitudes (and sometimes the signs) of the correlations between the characteristics of people
and their discount rates. The word ‘correlation’ is used here because much of the research
conducted regarding time preferences cannot claim causality. In other words, a measure of time
discounting is included in the econometric model as either a dependent or independent variable,
but no econometric or experimental technique has been utilized to distinguish between a causal
effect and a correlation that could exist for any number of reasons. In the case of time
preferences endogeneity, two-way-causality and omitted variable bias, are of particular concern
(Bauer & Chytilova, 2010).
Measures of discount rates have been associated with a variety of covariates in
econometric models. One of the most common indicators that is said to be associated with
discount rates is income (or wealth). Tanaka et al. (2010) find negative correlations between
discount rates and income in Vietnam. In other words, the higher one’s income, the lower the
discount rate (or the higher their level of patience). Interestingly, Anderson et al. (2004) find no
correlation between income and discount rates, while Kirby et al. finds a negative correlation
with income but no correlation with wealth accumulation in Bolivia (2002). In their experiment
in India, Bauer et al also do not find any correlation between income and discount rates (2012).
However, in Uganda Bauer and Chytilova find a more broad result (as they were not able to
directly measure income) that individuals who face less income pressures have lower discount
rates (2010). Overall, the relationship between income and discount rates appears to be mixed.
Other descriptive characteristics typically correlated with discount rates are age,
gender, and level of education. In terms of age, Kirby et al. (2002) and find a positive
correlation with discount rates in Bolivia, as do Bauer and Chytilova (2010) in Uganda. In other
words, both studies find that people discount faster as they become older. This relationship is
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consistent with the lifetime income hypothesis, where people are assumed to dynamically
optimize consumption partially based on their life expectancy (Bauer et al, 2010). However,
Anderson et al. (2004) find a negative correlation with subjects from Vietnam. In terms of
gender, Rubalcava et al. find that Mexican women are more patient than their male
counterparts (2009). Castillo et al. find a similar result with their experimental data on
elementary school-aged children in the United States (2011). This same result is found in the
aforementioned studies conducted by Kirby et al (2002) and Bauer and Chytilova (2012) in
Bolivia and India respectively. However, Anderson et al. (2004) and Bauer et al (2010) find no
significant difference in discount rates between men and women. The results for education
levels are also somewhat contentious. Harrison et al. (2002) finds a positive correlation between
discount rates and education levels among the Danes. Similarly Burks et al. find that levels of
education are positively correlated with discount rates. However, Kirby et al. (2002) finds the
opposite in Bolivia. Based on these studies, even the relationship between discount rates and the
most common control variables appears to be quite ambiguous.
One likely contributing factor to the lack of consensus regarding discount rates and
their relationships to the various aforementioned observables is the issue of causality. Perhaps
all of the mixed results are a symptom of the fact that economists are still striving to be able to
econometrically determine the direction of causality between economic outcomes and discount
rates (Tanaka, et al. 2010). One can easily see how a specific discount rate could determine a
specific economic outcome, like income or level of savings. However, it could be that a specific
economic situation, like having a low income, determines one’s discount rate. Both scenarios, or
a dynamic combination of the two, seem plausible.
Becker and Mulligan’s paper “The Endogenous Determination of Time Preference” is
most notable for being the first to model how a discount rate is formed, and will be heavily
relied on to inform the analysis of this research (1997). Their model allows for varying discount
rates both within and among individuals across time and across different decisions. They also
suggest that one’s discount rate can permanently change if he or she partakes in any number
activities that they argue will ultimately adjust how the individual perceives himself and his or
her future (Becker & Mulligan, 1997). These activities can include setting goals, education, and
religious practices. This means that the discount rate is not considered to be exogenous,
predetermined by biology or other factors, but that it can be actively adjusted if an individual
wishes to do so. They argue that this can be happen when an individual increases the amount of

	
  

9	
  

time and money spent on imagining oneself in the future. These imagining and investment
processes are considered to increase the perceived likelihood of future pleasures, and therefore
their value increases as well. This analysis can apply to the FII model, in that setting goals and
working toward their completion could certainly expand one’s imagination of future
possibilities.
The notion of intentionally investing in patience to attempt to change one’s discount
rate is a relatively new research topic within the field, partially because isolating a causal effect
for time preferences can be quite difficult econometrically. However, examining how one could
potentially become more patient – like the FII experiment in Medellin – has many development
implications, as previously discussed. Bauer and Chytilova utilize the analysis from Becker and
Mulligan’s endogenous time model and state that education can be classified as an investment
in patience (2010). While education and time preferences theoretically suffer from a myriad of
endogeneity issues, Bauer and Chytilova are able to examine the causal relationship between
education and patience due to the use of an instrumental variable technique. Their result is
consistent with Becker and Mulligan’s endogenous time preference model, and robust to
various instruments and specifications. They find that more education caused individuals’
discount rates to fall, implying more patience, as the endogenous time preference model would
suggest (Bauer & Chytilova, 2010). The FII research could produce similar results, as aiming to
achieve goals, seems like a similar investment in patience.
Truly observing this causal relationship is rare in the literature. Bauer and Cytilova
state in 2010 that they are not aware of any other study that can fully depart from the observed
correlation between discount rates and covariates. However, two other studies will be discussed
here because they at least are able to pin down the direction of causality. They do this are able
to do this because they evaluate discount rates first, and then measure a subsequent outcome
and compare those. So, both studies can say with confidence that committing a certain action in
the future could not affect the discount rates in the past. The first is Burks et al (2011). They
garner various measures of time preferences and compare those numbers with the attendance of
a job training program. They use a probit estimation with robust non-clustered standard errors
to estimate that a one standard deviation increase in the discount rate (subjects become more
impatient) engenders a lower probability of quitting the difficult job training (Burk et al, 2011).
Furthermore Castillo et al (2011) use the same technique of exploiting the dynamics to at least
pin down the direction of causality. They take measures of discount rates with children and
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correlate them with disciplinary referrals the following year. The dependent variable is number
of disciplinary referrals received, and they find that an increase in impatience is associated with
an increase in the number of referrals (Castillo et al 2011). The authors choose an OLS
estimation, clustering standard errors at the school and classroom level. While both of these
studies are able to pin down the direction of causality simply due to the dynamic nature of their
data, they are not able to econometrically resolve the possibility of an additional omitted
variable that is affecting both their impact variables and the outcomes. The FII experiment
stuffers less from this problem because of the randomization involved, and this is where the FII
experiment adds to the literature.
2.4 Time Preferences and the FII Model
As noted by the literature above, there is some evidence that setting goals, receiving
achievement-based financial incentives, and being in a group could affect subjects’ time
preferences. However, each component could affect time preferences differently so it is useful
to examine each one individually. When looking to the incentive component, the most
comparable program being implemented in the developing world today is that of the
conditional cash transfer. In 2009, Rubalcava et al. find evidence that the conditional cash
transfer program, PROGRESSA in rural Mexico, is a contributing factor to their observations
that women were more patient than men. This points to the fact that incentives and other
forms of empowerment (also found in FII) could lead to more patience (Rubalcava et al., 2009).
When looking to the goal component, a particularly useful study is that by Ida et al
(2011). Theirs is one of the few studies to take measurements of discount rates pre and post
intervention like the FII research, rather than ex post or one-time measurements like the vast
majority of empirical studies (2011). The authors study the effect of discount rates on the
probability that one will succeed at quitting smoking. They find that discount rate is actually a
good predictor of success in smoking cessation. More pertinent to this research, they also find
the reverse effect, where successfully quitting smoking further differentiates the discount rates
(Ida et al, 2011). So people who succeeded became even more patient and those who failed
became even more impatient after their respective successes or failures. This is a great indicator
that goal-achievement programs can indeed affect participants’ time preferences.
The literature on the relationship between groups and time preferences is somewhat
lacking. However, Bauer et al. conduct research among micro finance borrowers that are
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members of self-help groups in India (2012). They find evidence that the women who borrow
are more present-biased than those who do not, and that the self-help micro finance groups
actually provide a commitment device (Bauer, et al. 2012). In other words, they find that the
women who are more present-biased tend to join the self-help group due to it’s required weekly
payment structures, and that this helps them mitigate the consequences of their present bias.
This is consistent with a finding in Kenya that suggests that present-biased individuals use the
social pressure of ROSCAs as a commitment device to save more than they otherwise would
(Gugerty, 2007). This implies that being part of a group that holds its members accountable, as
found in FII, can act as a commitment device for people with existing present bias, potentially
decreasing present bias over time.
As evidenced by all of the above literature, this research is particularly topical, as there
exists surprisingly little research that estimates a causal effect of how time preferences are
formed, and this is especially true in developing countries (Bauer and Chyitlova 2010). The FII
project is also novel because it is a wholly experimental intervention, where we can control for
some of the many biases and endogeneity issues found in previous empirical works.
Additionally, the dynamic evolution of discount rates with respect to economic outcomes, goalsetting, achievement-based incentives, and group participation has not been studied before in
this fashion to the researcher’s knowledge. Thus, the results could prove to be a valuable
addition to this literature, as well as have poignant and useful policy implications for economic
development.

3. Methodology and Sample Description
3.1 Context – Medellin, Colombia and Banco de las Oportunidades
Colombia is located in the Northwestern region of South America, and is considered by
the World Bank to be an upper-middle income country. However, poverty is a large concern in
rural areas and among internally displaced populations. The population of the country is just
under 50 million people, with 45.5 percent of the population below the country’s poverty line
and 18 percent are living on less than $1.25 per day (UNFPA, 2011). Despite its “upper-middle
income” classification, the dispersion of income is rather unequal, as the share of income for
poorest quintile is less than three percent (UNFPA, 2011). The FII experiment was conducted
in Medellin, the second largest city in Colombia. It is located in the state of Antioquia, which is
in the northwestern part of the country. It has a population of roughly 2.5 million people, with
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38 percent of the population living under the poverty line, and ten percent in living extreme
poverty (Municipality of Medellin, 2010). The city has recently been recognized for it’s
innovative development programs and acknowledged as a global city on-the-rise (Wall Street
Journal, 2013; The Guardian, 2012). Thus, Medellin proved to be an ideal place to implement
the FII model due to its relatively strong institutions and a culture of entrepreneurship.
The FII experiment was conducted in conjunction with Banco de las Oportunidades, a
public micro finance institution (MFI) in Medellin. Banco de las Oportunidades is operated by
the mayor’s office of Medellin, and offers low-income residents of Medellin access to a variety
of social programs within which to participate. All members of the MFI must live in and
operate a business in Medellin or it’s various suburbs. The members must be within the bottom
three (of six) federally designated income brackets, also referred to as strata. Additionally, the
members must be between the ages of 18 and 64 years of age, and can be either male or female.
All must have what the MFI considers to be an acceptable credit score, and must not have an
outstanding loan with any other financial institution or NGO. The majority of the MFI’s
members participate in at least one of various programs. These programs include solidarity
groups, microfinance loans, community development centers, a program devoted to local
artisans, and a program devoted to innovative entrepreneurs.
3.2 Experimental Design
One hundred fifty-nine subjects were recruited to participate in the FII experiment, and
were randomly selected from the database of Banco de las Oportunidades. After consenting to
participate, the subjects were randomly assigned into five different treatment groups. The
experiment was designed in such a way that the effect of each component of the FII model –
groups, goals, and incentives – could be separately observed. Figure 1 is a matrix illustrating
structure of the experimental design. Every group within the matrix declares a goal and has
varying group and incentive components. The subjects in Treatment Group II declare goals,
but do not receive achievement-based incentives, nor are they part of a group. Rather, they
received a payment each meeting that was equivalent to what we believed would be the average
payout of those subjects in the achievement-based incentives group (30,000 COP, or roughly 17
USD). The subjects in Treatment Group III declared goals, and were part of a group. These
subjects took part in group meetings, discussed their goals, and filled out a survey each
meeting. They had the same incentive scheme as Group II, as they were both in the “no prize”
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treatment group, which means they had a non-conditional payment structure. The subjects in
Treatment Group IV declared goals and were paid based on their achievement of those goals.
These subjects declared one goal per month, and were paid under the achievement-based
conditional payment structure. If the subject achieved their declared goal, they were paid what
amounted to be approximately one day’s wage in Medellin (35,000 COP, or roughly 20 USD).
If they did not achieve their goal, the subjects were paid enough money to cover their
transportation costs (5,000 COP, or roughly 3 USD). They were paid based on verifiable
records of achievement, which were examined at every meeting when the subjects completed a
survey. The subjects in this treatment group did not attend group meetings, as they were in the
“no group” treatment. Subjects in Treatment Group V declared goals, were paid by the
achievement-based conditional payment structure, and participated in group meetings.
Treatment Group V represents the full FII model, as it contains all three components.
To hold true to the FII model, all of the subjects in each of the four treatment groups
(excluding the control groups) met every four weeks. During these monthly meetings, each
subject was asked to choose a goal to work towards achieving from a predetermined list of 14
goals provided by the enumerators. The list of goals is shown in Figure 2. In addition to
choosing a goal, the subjects in each treatment group were asked to report on his or her goal
achievement from the previous four weeks by filling out a survey of about 20 questions
inquiring about each of the possible goals. The Goal Survey is provided in Appendix A. At the
end of each meeting, each subject provided proof of their goal achievement (if applicable), were
paid according to their level achievement and/or payment structure, and selected a goal to
work towards for the next four weeks. Depending on treatment group, subjects discussed their
progress with their group in the monthly meetings as well. There were a total of seven
meetings in the time period of June through December 2012. Each subject in the four treatment
groups completed an additional survey at baseline, the mid-point, and at the end of the FII
experiment. The Baseline, Mid-Point, Endline Survey is provided in Appendix A. This survey
contains questions regarding the subjects’ self-esteem, risk aversion, reference points, economic
indicators, social capital, and discount rates.
Aside from the groups within the matrix, two external control groups, Control Group A
and Control Group B, were included. The control groups A and B did not declare goals, did not
receive achievement-based incentives, or attend group meetings. The subjects in each control
group received a show up fee (25,000 COP, or roughly 14 USD) each time they filled out a
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survey. The two control groups did not meet monthly, and thus had a different survey schedule
than the four treatment groups. Control Group A filled out the Goal Survey and the Baseline,
Mid-point, Endline Survey once in June for the baseline, once at the midpoint, and again in
December for the endline measurements. The subjects were asked to recall the monthly Goal
Survey data for each month up until their last meeting, so a balanced panel could be formed.
Control Group B was surveyed only one time at the endline. These subjects were asked to
recall the previous six months to answer goal-related questions about their behavior during the
same timeframe of the FII experiment. The subjects in Control Group B were made aware of
the dates of various holidays and other notable dates as a tool to assist in accurate responses.
Again, having six months worth of data on past behavior allows for a balanced panel dataset to
be formed. This dual control group design was used in an effort to minimize the effect of any
additional goal achievement of the subjects in Control Group A due to a potential framing
effect of the survey questions asking about goal achievement outcomes.
The analysis provided later in this paper relies heavily on the fact that the subjects were
asked to set goals. Therefore, a more in-depth discussion of this process is warranted. Each
subject within the four treatment groups was asked to pick a goal from a preset list of 14 goals
(Figure 2), which was unchanged throughout the experiment. The goals on this list were
chosen by the researchers for a few important reasons. First, prior to the experiment’s
inception, focus groups were held during which a survey was administered. The survey asked
questions such as, “If you could change one thing about your business, what would it be?” The
topics ranged from business, to home and family life, to the individuals themselves. This survey
provided a framework around which to base the goals. The second reason these particular goals
were chosen is that all of them are verifiable. In other words, the researchers were able to think
of a relatively easy and inexpensive way that the subjects could provide proof that his or her
goal was achieved. This proof was required in order for the goal to be recorded as achieved.
Figure 2 illustrates the required verification method for each goal, as well as the relative
frequencies each goal was chosen. The most frequently chosen goals were to save a certain
amount per month, to keep accounting of the family business, to attend one of the various 40hour courses given by the Banco de las Oportunidades, and to make a payment on an
outstanding debt.

These, as well as most of the other goals, require planning ahead, a

contemporaneous sacrifice in order to see some future benefit, and imagining one’s life in the
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future which is in line with what Becker and Mulligan would consider to be an investment in
patience (1997).
As previously mentioned, the subjects’ discount rates were elicited on three separate
occasions throughout the experiment. This was done via survey using a combination of

Mazur’s (1987) binary choice protocol and a fill-in-the-blank protocol. On each occasion
during which discount rates were measured, the subjects were asked to choose between a
receiving a hypothetical amount of Colombian pesos now, or a larger amount at a time in the
future. If a subject chose the “now” option, the survey instructs him or her to proceed to the
following question. The second question has the same initial monetary value, but asks the
subject to choose between that and an even larger amount of money in the same future period.
If still the subject chose the “now” option, the survey asks him or her to write down how much
they would be willing to accept in order for them to wait the designated time period to receive
payment. This was done for future delays of one, six, and twelve months. There was
intentionally no front-end delay employed so that the degree of present bias can be evaluated.
The discount factor for each subject is calculated by subtracting the original amount
(200,000 COP) from the amount the subject stated he or she would be willing to accept, and
then dividing by the original amount. This is done so that the discount rate times the amount
the subject is willing to accept should be equal to the original amount. In other words, it is the
point at which the subject is assumed to be indifferent between the two amounts, and thus the
discount factor represents rate at which the subject truly discounts money, or the discount rate.
For the purposes of this study, it is important to note that the main interests are the differences
of the time preferences across time and across treatment groups within our sample, and not
necessarily in the particular absolute values. All of the subjects faced the same protocol, and it
is feasible to assume that any biases in terms of effort and understanding are not systematic
across treatment groups, and are consistent within the same individual over the six month time
period.
3.3 Sample Description
Table 1 is a table of summary statistics that indicates some notable characteristics of the
sample, and shows that the subjects in the treatment and control groups were not significantly
different from each other at the inception of this study. The table shows that the control group
started out on average more patient, with less income, more educated, slightly more women,
and older in age. None of these differences are statistically significant, which shows that the
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randomization was successful. Thus, any divergence in these variables can arguably be
attributed to the experimental intervention. However, compared to those in the control, the
subjects in the treatment groups are significantly (p=0.02) more present-biased. This is not
ideal but it does mean that if there is a statistically significant decrease in present bias over time
in the treatment groups, this effect will actually be underestimated. However, it could also
mean that any small significant effect might not be able to be observed with this data. Some
additional characteristics of our sample are that 21 percent of the subjects have only an
elementary school education, 66 percent of the subjects have attended at least high school
and/or taken courses from a technical or trade school. Only five percent of the subjects are
illiterate. The average age of participants is 40.4 years. While all of our subjects have their own
businesses, the most common business types are in the realm of food and beverages (33
percent), artisan and craft activities (18 percent), and textiles and/or manufacturing (14
percent). The remaining 35 percent of the subjects’ businesses are split into categories
including services, technology, trade and commerce, and agriculture.
It is useful to further examine the baseline levels of discount rates by treatment group,
income level, education, and gender to inform the interpretations later on in the analysis.
Present Bias is a function of these discount rates, so it further informs that analysis as well.
Table 2 illustrates that baseline discount rates by treatment group are not statistically different
from each other, regardless of how the data is cut. However it should be noted that both the FII
treatment group variable and the general group treatment variable contain subjects that
started off more impatient than the rest, significant at the 15 percent level. This will be
important later on in the analysis section of this model. Additionally, in Table 3 illustrates that
the males in the sample had higher discount rates at baseline, and that people with an income
strata of 3 or above also had higher discount rates. The gender difference is consistent with the
literature, but the lower income brackets having more patience is inconsistent with most
findings, although neither of these differences are statistically significant. And finally, those
that have a high school education or less are also more impatient than those who have higher
than a high school education, which is also significant with the literature, though not
statistically significant. Again, it can be assumed based on this information that any systematic
change in the subject’s rates by treatment group can be attributed to the FII experiment.
Another characteristic of the data is that it can take a panel form. One hundred fifty nine
subjects total subjects were initially included in the FII experiment, and were asked about their
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time preferences during three different time periods. This allows for the formation of a long
panel dataset, which can be used examine each subject i across time t. However, if a subject
missed either the midpoint or endline meetings, they have a missing value for their discount
rate for that meeting. A total of 31 subjects missed either the midline or the endline meeting,
which is nearly one fourth of the total sample. Notably, it is very possible that attrition in the
FII experiment is correlated with time preferences, which could bias any econometric estimates
provided by this study. Thus, Table 3 is provided to demonstrate that the baseline time
preferences of those people who missed a follow up meeting in the FII experiment do not
significantly differ from those who did not miss any meetings. The t-test comparing the
discount rate between those subjects that missed one or more of the follow up meetings shows
that while the people who missed a meeting were on average more impatient at baseline, it is
not statistically significant. When looking to present-bias, it turns out that those who missed a
meeting were less present biased than those who did not, though it is also not statistically
significant. Furthermore, when looking to the lower portion of Table 3, it is evident that the
number of people who missed at least one of the follow up meetings is fairly consistent across
group. Based on the results in the table, the attrition rate does not appear to be correlated with
the dependent variables or the independent variables of interest. Thus, the analysis can proceed
with the assumption that all missing values are missing as if random.

4. Models, Hypotheses, and Analysis
Based on the analysis provided in studies performed in conjunction with this one, it has
been established that the subjects in the FII treatment group experienced statistically more
behavioral and economic changes than those in the other treatment and control groups. Now,
the next step is to attempt to identify a mechanism through which this is occurring. This
section will explore several models as ways to explore a change in time preferences as a
possible mechanism.
4.1 Model 1 – The FII Model and Discount Rates
Model (1) is meant to answer the first research question: To what extent does
participating in the FII experiment affect measures of the subjects’ discount rates? As
mentioned, the dataset is in panel form. However, the data does not meet the assumptions
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appropriate to run a random effects panel regression, and all of the variables of interest are
fixed over time, meaning that a fixed effects panel regression would yield zero coefficient
estimates. Thus, this model is run in Stata as a pooled OLS estimation, with time dummy
variables and clustered standard errors at the individual level to account for the fact that each
subject’s error term in one period is likely to be corrated with his or her error terms in the
other time periods. This is a violation of the OLS assuptions and would lead to biased
estimates. Using the time dummy variables and clustering the standard errors in this way, the
model acts as a fixed effects model and, as such, is able to generate a within estimator. Thus,
the formal model is presented below in reduced form.
DiscountRate it = β1 Goal it + β2 Group it + β3 Incentive it + β4 FII it + β5X it + e it
In Model (1), the dependent variable is individual i’s discount rate in time t. This is a
continuous variable and is calculated by survey question with hypothetical payoffs, where a
higher discount rate represents a lower level of patience. Recall that each subject i has three
different measures of their discount rate per time t, differing in the length of delay the subject
has to hypothetically wait to receive their money. To reiterate again, the subjects were asked if
they would prefer money in the current time period or an increased amount in one, six, or
twelve months. The rates have all been annualized and averaged so that each subject has one
discount rate per time t represented in this model, which accounts for potential dynamic
inconsistency. Furthermore, after examining the distribution of the values of the subjects’
discount rates, the residuals, and squared residuals, it has been determined that the errors are
heteroskedastic and logging the discount rate variable is warranted. This has been done in all
regressions for Model (1).
The left-hand side variables of interest are Goal, Group, Incentive and FII. They are all
binomial dummy variables that take a value of one if the subject is in the treatment group
corresponding with its name. The FII variable is the interaction of all three. These treatment
status variables remain constant through the entirety of the experiment. As evidenced by the
Experimental Design matrix, unless the subject is in Group II, or the Control, he or she will
have a value of one for at least two of these variables. To avoid multicolinearity and biased
estimates, the Control Group dummy variable has been left out of the estimation. The X
represents a vector of individual-specific covariates. Contained in this vector are the variables
Education, IncomeStrata, Gender and Age. Education is an ordinal variable that can take values
from zero to six. Zero represents no education and six represents a graduate degree or higher.
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The variable IncomeStrata represents the number assigned to each individual by the Colombian
federal government that takes a value between one and six. The government uses these
numbers to determine how much federal assistance each household receives; one represents the
lowest level income. Gender is a binomial dummy variable where one is equal to female. Age is
listed in years.
4.2 Hypothesis 1 – Achievement and Discount Rates
Based on the theoretical findings of Becker and Mulligan (1997) and the recent
empirical findings of Ida et al (2011), Rubalcava (2009), and Bauer and Chytilova (2010), there
is evidence that the subjects’ discount rates could be affected by participating in the FII
experiment. Thus the following hypotheses are presented:
Ho: β1 = β2 = β3 = β4 = 0

HA: β1 + β2 + β3 + β4 ≠ 0

4.3 Analysis 1 – The FII Model and Discount Rates
Due to the randimization component of the FII experiment, econometric identification
is fairly straight-forward. In fact, according to Harrison and List (2004), in a controlled
experiment like the FII experiment, a simple t-test is all that is technically needed in the way of
identifying a treatment effect. Table 4 shows various t-tests, comparing the average of the
discount rate meaure by treatment group and the other controls. When looking at Table 4,
there are only two statistically significant differences in the means. The first is that of the goal
treatment, where the people in the goal treatment are statistically more patient than those that
are not (P=0.04). The second is that those in the FII treatment group (Group V) are on average
statistically more impatient than those that are not (P=0.005). From the t-tests alone, it
appears as though the largest effect of the FII experiment on discount rates is actually making
the subjects more impatient, although it is important to keep in mind that the FII treatment
group started off more impatient at baseline.
The regression output can show if the relationship observed by the t-tests holds even
when including control variables and clustered standard errors. Table 5 shows the results of
the pooled OLS estimation. It appears the results from the t-tests are robust to control
variables and the clustering of standard errors. The Goal variable remains negative and
statistically significant at the ten percent level for all of the estimations except for the final
where age is included. This supports the result from the t-test that suggest that setting a goal
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made the subjects more patient. There is no statistically significant impact of Group or Incentive
on the subjects’ discount rates. However, an interesting result is that the FII variable remains
positive and statistically significant at least at the ten percent level throughout all estimations.
This result implies that the subjects in the FII treatment group became more impatient over
time. Notably, the Age variable is also positive and significant, indicating that the older a
subject is, the less likely they were to become more patient over time.
The coefficients in a regression with a logged dependent variable can be somewhat
tricky to interpret. The coefficient in the final estimation with all controls is 0.75. Because the
dependent variable in the regression is in log form, the coeffients are interpreted as a
proportional change in the discount rate, given a one unit increase in the independent variable.
In the case of the FII coefficient, the interpretation is that being in the FII treatment group
caused the subjects on average to experience approxamately a 75 percent increase in their
discount rate. Thus, if the original discount rate of a subject was 100 percent, his or her
discount rate increased to 175 percent. Similarly if the original discount rate is 50 percent, the
coefficient is interpreted as a 75 percent increase in his or her discount rate, thus it increases to
87.5 percent. This of course is an average for those subjects in the FII treatment group only.
The results so far indicate that setting a goal has a non-significant negative effect on
discount rates, and that being in the FII treatment group has a significantly positive effect on
the subjects’ discount rates. This result is unexpected and seems counter-intuitive, and thus
merits further investigation. Table 6 shows the results from the OLS regressions estimating
the effect of the treatment groups and control variables on discount rates per time period.
Ideally this will provide more insight into the evolution of the discount rates over time. The
final column of Table 6 shows that the FII coefficient only becomes significant in the last
period. Figure 3 shows the histogram of the discount rates for the subjects in the FII treatment
group at the endline. It appears that there are some relatively extreme outliers in the right-side
tail of the distribution, which could be upwardly biasing the linear relationship between the FII
treatment group and the discount rates. Therefore the results of a new specification will be
explored.
Some experimental economists have called into question the comparability of discount
rates, as people’s perceptions of time differ amongst each other (Thaler, 1981; Luhmann, 2013).
Furthermore, it is not necessarily the rate itself that is the interest of this research, but rather
the relative change in patience from the beginning to the end within each subject. Therefore,
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Table 7 presents an alternative estimation to answer the first research question. Rather than
the dependent variable being discount rates themselves, the dependent variable is now a
dummy variable called Patience, taking the value of a one if the subject became more patient
between the baseline and the endline measurements of the discount rates. In other words, if the
average discount rate decreased from the baseline to endline measurements, the subjects’ value
of the Patience variable is one. This estimation is also useful because the interpretation of the
coefficients is more straightforward. It is important to note that most of the coefficients except
for that of the FII variable have a consistent sign with the estimation in Table 5 (remember
that a negative discount rate in Table 5 is consistent with becoming more patient in Table 7, a
positive probability). This indicates that the two estimations are getting at relatively the same
thing. Table 7 indicates that setting a goal alone makes the subjects more likely to become
more patient. In the final estimation with all controls, the coefficient of the Goal variable is
0.141, which indicates that setting a goal made the subjects 14.1 percentage points more likely
to become more patient over the course of the FII experiment. Until the last estimation,
Education is positive and significant, which is consistent with the literature.

4.4 Model 2 – The FII Model and Present Bias
Model (2) is meant to answer the second research question: To what extent does
participating in the FII experiment affect measures of the subjects’ present bias? As in Model
(1), the dataset is in panel form, and thus the preferred estimation technique is a pooled OLS
including dummy variables for time and clustered standard errors at the individual level. The
formal model is provided below in reduced form:
PresentBias it = β1 Goal it + β2 Group it + β3 Incentive it + β4 FII it + β5X it + e it
In Model (2), the dependent variable is the measure of subject i’s present bias in time t.
In this study, present bias is measured by subtracting subject i’s logged discount rate with a
twelve-month delay from his or her annualized and logged discount rate with a one-month
delay. If the subject has perfectly consistent time prefernces, the annualized discount rate
measurement should be the same in both periods, meaning the PresentBias variable will have a
value of zero. If the subject exhibits present bias, where one is more impatient when presented
with a choice with a shorter delay and more patient with longer delays, the PresentBias variable
will be positive and increasing as the difference gets larger. Similarly, if the subject is future
biased, more patient with a shorter delay and impatient with longer delays, the PresentBias
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variable will be negative, and increasingly so as the difference between the two measures gets
larger. This is very similar and consistent with the measurement technique Bauer et al (2012)
use in their study of present bias among microfinance borrowers in India. The variables of
interest and the X vector of covariates are the same as described for Model (1).
4.5 Hypothesis 2 – Achievement and Discount Rates
As indicated in the literature review, there has yet to be any significant and/or
consistent empirical finding regarding how present-bias is formed and how it changes over
time. However, there is evidence that self-help groups are used as a comitment device to hold
present-biased individuals to commitments that they might not otherwise keep. This indicates
that perhaps participating in the FII model could affect present bias. With this in mind, the
following two hypotheses are presented:
Ho: β1 = β2 = β3 = β4 = 0

HA: β1 + β2 + β3 + β4 ≠ 0

4.6 Analysis 2 – Achievement and Discount Rates
To begin the analysis of present bias it’s important to show it exists in the first place
and that it changes over time. Figure 4 demonstrates that there is indeed present bias within
the data, as it is apparent that the discount rates of the subjects becomes significantly lower as
the delay gets larger than one month. Richard Thaler (1981) notes that the absolute values of
the discount rates are not as important compared to the difference between each subject’s
discount rate for the different delay times. This section explores this relative difference and
how it changes over time. The analysis will again begin by examining t-tests. These are
meaningful to the identification strategy due to the randomization component of this study.
Table 8 shows the various pooled t-tests of the PresentBias variable done by treatment group,
which are the variables of interest. From this table it can be gathered that both the goal
treatment and the FII treatment have an effect on the level of present bias. However, the Goal
variable is associated with a higher level of present bias, and the FII variable is associated with
a lower level of present bias. Again, we see that these two treatments have the opposite effect
on time preferences, which is interesting and at least consistent with the discount rate findings.
Looking to the regression analysis, it is evident that the preliminary results from the ttests hold to the addition of control variables, time dummy variables, as well as clustered
standard errors at the individual level. Table 9 shows the output of the pooled OLS estimation
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with all of the aforementioned specifications. Again, these results indicate that being in the goal
treatment group makes one statistically more present-biased, whereas the FII treatment group
subjects were found to be statistically less present-biased on average. The dependent variable in
this regression is the difference of two logged discount rates, and thus the coefficients should be
interpreted as proportional changes in this difference. Thus, the Goal coefficient can be
interpreted as a 67.4 percent proportional increase in the measure of present-bias, i.e. the
difference between the one-month and twelve-month delay measures of the discount rates
overtime. And the FII coefficient can be interpreted as a 52 percent proportional decrease in the
measure of present-bias. Table 9 also indicates that the level of income is highly correlated
with relatively lower levels of present-bias.

5. Discussion, Limitations, and Conclusion
It appears that the effects of setting goals and participating in the full FII model have
conflicting effects in the majority of the estimations specified in this paper. While at first this
might seem counter intuitive, this does not necessarily have to be the case. When looking to the
effect of setting a goal on time preferences, reexamining the Becker and Mulligan (1997)
endogenous time preferences model is warranted. The authors discuss at length that setting a
goal, and other forms of imagining one’s future, can increase the perceived likelihood of a
particular future, thus making the future more valuable. When looking at this in the context of
the average discount rate, this hypothesis, as well as the empirical evidence found in Uganda by
Bauer and Chyitlova (2010), is very much consistent with the results presented for Model 1.
The effect of the goal-setting exercise alone decreased the subjects’ discount rates over time.
However, how can this be reconciled with the increase in present bias seen in Model 2?
Recall that the dependent variable for Model 1 is the average discount rate across the
various delay periods for subject i in time t, and that the relative difference between the onemonth delay discount rate and the one-year delay discount rate is the outcome variable in
Model 2. Keeping this in mind, perhaps what is actually occurring is that imagining oneself in
the future (goal-setting) only makes one’s future self more patient. In other words, perhaps the
one-year delay discount rate is getting lower over time due to setting a goal, but the one month
stays relatively the same. This would make the overall average lower, and yet the difference
between the two larger over time. The exact same trend appears to be occurring in the case of

	
  

24	
  

the FII treatment group, except in the opposite directions. This indicates that there is
something about the interaction of setting goals, receiving conditional incentives, and
participating in a group that decreases the levels of present-bias, but has no effect (or a negative
effect) on the average level of patience. It appears that the interaction of all there is indeed a
unique and special combination, yielding results unmatched by any other treatment or control
group.
Although the results are interesting and consistent with each other, this study is not
without it’s limitations. The most glaring limitation is the validity of the measurements of the
discount rates themselves. The protocol used in this study and slight variations thereof are
quite common in the time preferences literature. In fact, many economists have done research
on protocols alone, comparing their relative results. One notable characteristic of the protocol
used in the FII experiment is that the payoffs are hypothetical. This could lead to misestimation
of the discount rates if the subjects do not take the choice seriously. For example, in their study
Cummings et al (1995) find that the hypothetical answers were statistically different from the
real ones in a non-parametric chi-squared test. Additionally, when conducting a meta-analysis
of over 29 studies, List and Gallet (2001) find that the preferences elicited by hypothetical
questions are overstated by a factor of three times the real amount. Another unique aspect of
this protocol is that it combines the binary choice method and the fill in the blank method.
Weatherly et al (2011) conduct an experiment that compares the two methodologies with the
same subjects and finds differences in the discount rates elicited by each method, and that the
fill-in the blank method typically yields higher discount rates.
On the contrary, Locey et al (2011) find that hypothetical payoffs produce no different
results than real payoffs in two different experiments eliciting different measures of discount
rates. They argue that hypothetical rewards realistically apply to everyday life. Furthermore,
the subjects were being paid for their general participation in the study, which perhaps
compelled them to give more careful consideration to the questions than they otherwise would
have. Also it is important to keep in mind that the absolute discount rates themselves are less
important. In other words, the values themselves can be seen as arbitrary, as long as the
relative changes in these values for each subject remain unbiased. As long as there is an
assumption that each subject was consistent over the course of the study, and a decrease in the
discount rate from one period to the next truly represents an increase in patience, then the
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dummy variable estimation and present bias estimations should largely avoid this limitation
because they highlight the movement within each subject as the outcome variables.
The success of the FII experiment merits further research. While the mechanism for its
success does appear to be somewhat through the change in time preferences of the subjects, the
discovery of further mechanisms remains an important task. If development economists could
not only understand that FII works, but also exactly how and why it works, replication could
have serious and positive consequences for the developing world. Given the findings of this
study, as well as the other studies conducted in conjunction with the FII experiment, it has
important policy implications in and of itself. It indicates that a model such as the FII model
can be used as a relatively cheap tool to inspire the achievement of development-oriented goals,
speaking to a new model of poverty alleviation. Additionally this study is unique because it is
one of the few empirical studies that measures the same subjects’ discount rates over time, and
demonstrates how they can be changed. Thus, continuing to pursue development programs like
the FII model that can change subjects’ tendencies to be present-biased could have tangible and
desirable economic outcomes for the world’s poor.

	
  

26	
  

Works Cited
Anderson, C. L., Dietz, M., Gordon, A., & Klawitter, M. (2004). Discount rates in Vietnam. Economic
Development and Cultural Change, 52(4), 873-887. Retrieved from URL:
http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/381111
Bauer, M., & Chytilova, J. (2010). The impact of education on the subjective discount rate in Ugandan
villages. Economic Development and Cultural Change, 58(4), 643-669.
Bauer, M., Chytilova, J., & Morduch, J. (2012). Behavioral foundations of microcredit: Experimental and
survey evidence from rural India. American Economic Review, 101(2), 1118-39.
Becker, G., & Mulligan, C. (1997). The endogenous determination of time preference. The Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 112(3), 729-758. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/2951254
Beteman, Milford. 2012. “Medellín emerges as a Latin American trailblazer for local economic growth”.
The Guardian. Retrieved from http://www.guardian.co.uk/global-development/povertymatters/2012/apr/03/medellin-trailblazer-local-economic-growth?intcmp=122
Burks, S. V., Carpenter, J., Gotte, L., & Rustichini, A. (2011) Which measures of time preference best
predict outcomes? Evidence form a large-scale field experiment. Institute for the Study of Labor
Discussion Paper Series, 5808, 1-23.
Camilo Cardenas, J., & Carpenter, J. (2008). Behavioural development economics: Lessons from field labs
in the developing world. Journal of Development Studies, 44(3), 311-338. Retrieved from
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00220380701848327
Castillo, M., Ferraro, P. J., Jordan , L. J., & Petrie, R. (2011). The today and tomorrow of kids: Time
preferences and educational outcomes of children. Journal of Public Economics, 95, 1377-1385.
Castuera, M., Chao, M., Miller, M., & Sadowski, K. (2004). Pathways Out of Poverty, Early Lessons of
the Family Independence Initiative The First Two Years of Operation 2001-2003. Retrieved
January 4, 2012 from http://www.fiinet.org/reports/FII-Two-Year-Report-Pathways-out-ofPoverty.pdf
Fisher, I. (1930), The Theory of Interest, (New York: Macmillan).
Gugerty, M. K. (2007). You can't save alone: Commitment in rotating savings and credit associations in
Kenya. Economic Development and Cultural Change, 55(2), 251-282.
Harrison, G. W., Cummings, R. G., Rustrom, E. E. (1995). Homegrown Values and Hypothetical
Surveys: is the Dichotomous Choice Approach Incentive Compatible?" American Economic
Review, 85, March, 260-266.
Harrison, G., Lau, M., & Williams, M. (2002). Estimating individual discount rates in Denmark: A field
experiment. The American Economic Review, 92(5), 1606-1617.
Harrison, G. W., Lau, M. L., & Elisabet , E. R. (2010). Individual discount rates and smoking: Evidence
from a field experiment in denmark. Journal of Health Economics, 29, 708-717.
Hausman, J. (1979). Individual Discount Rates and the Purchase and Utilization of Energy-Using
Durables. Bell Journal of Economics, 10(1), 33-54.

	
  

27	
  

Herrnstein, R. J., & Chung, S. (n.d.). Choice and delay of reinforcement. (1967). Journal of the
Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 1(10), 67-74.
Ida, T., Goto, R., Takahashi, Y., & Nishimura, S. (2011). Can economic-psychological parameters predict
successful smoking cessation? The Journal of Socio-Economics, 40, 285-295. Retrieved from
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1053535711000060
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A., (1979). Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under
risk. Econometrica,47(2), 263-292. Retrieved from http://3xfund.com.cn/images/article008.pdf
Kirby, K., Godoy, R., Reyes-Garcia, V., Byron, E., Apaza, L., Leonard, W., Perez, E., & Vadez, V. (2002).
Correlates of delay-discount rates: Evidence from Tsimane' Amerindians of the Bolivian rain
forest. Journal of Economic Psychology, 23, 291-316. Retrieved from
http://www.ugr.es/~pbg/rte/kirby.pdf
List, J. A., & Gallet, C. (n.d.). What experimental protocol influence disparities between actual and
hypothetical stated values?: Evidence from a meta-analysis. (2001). Environmental and Resource
Economics, (20), 241-254.
Locey, M., Jones, B. A., & Rachlin, H. (2011). Real and hypothetical rewards in self-control and social
discounting. Judgment and Decision Making, 6(6), 552-564.
Luhmann, C. C. (n.d.). Discounting of delayed rewards is not hyperbolic. (2013). Journal of Experimental
Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, doi: 10.1037/a0031170
Mazur, J.E. (1987). An adjusting procedure for studying delayed reinforcement. In M. L. Commons, J.
E. Mazur, J. A. Nevin, & H. Rachlin (Eds.), Quantitative Anal- yses of Behavior: Vol. 5. The Effect of
Delay and Intervening Events on Reinforcement Value (pp. 55–73). Hillsdale, N.J.: Erlbaum.
Miller, M. (2011). The uphill battle to scale an innovative antipoverty approach: The experience of the
Family Independence Initiative. New American Foundation. Retrieved from
http://www.fiinet.org/reports/Uphill%20Battle%20New%20America.pdf
Municipality of Medellin. 2010. Cultura E Medellin. P.57 - 67. Retrieved from
http://www.culturaemedellin.gov.co/sites/CulturaE/PublishingImages/LIBRO_CULTURA_
E.pdf
Rohde, K. (n.d.). The hyperbolic factor: A measure of time inconsistency. (2010). Journal of Risk and
Uncertainty , 41, 125-140.
Robberstad, B., & Cairns, J. (2007). Time preferences for health in northern Tanzania: An empirical
analysis of alternative discounting models. Pharmacoeconmics, 25(1), 73-88.
Rubalcava, L., Teruel, G., & Thomas, D. (2009). Investments, time preferences, and public transfers paid
to women. Economic Development and Cultural Change, 57(3), 507-538. Retrieved from
http://paa2008.princeton.edu/download.aspx?submissionId=81825
Samuelson, P. (1937). A Note on measurement of utility. Review of Economic Studies, 4(2), 155-161.
Tanaka, T., Camerer, C., & Nguyen, Q. (2010). Risk and time preferences: Linking experimental and
household survey data from Vietnam. American Economic Review, 100(1), 557-571. Retrieved
from http://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/pdfplus/10.1257/aer.100.1.557

	
  

28	
  

Thaler, R. (1981). Some empirical evidence on dynamic inconsistency. Economic Letters, 8(3), 201-207.
Retrieved from http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(81)90067-7
United Nations Population Fund. (2011). Country profiles: Colombia. Retrieved from
http://www.unfpa.org/public/_ns/YWRleGVyby1mZC1wb3J0bGV0OjpkZXhlcm8tZmQtcG9
ydGxldDo6LTYyYTZhNDI5OjEyOTk2MDgxYzg3Oi03ZmYxfGVhY3Rpb249MT12aWV3R
GF0YVZpZXc_/cache/bypass/appid/310297_1/home/sitemap/countries
Wall Street Journal. (2013). City of the year. Retrieved from http://online.wsj.com/ad/cityoftheyear
Weatherly, J. N., & Derenne, A. (2011). Comparing delay discounting rates when using the fill-in-theblank and multiple-choice methods. The Journal of General Psychology, 4(138), 300-318.
Wilson, R. (2011). The contribution of behavioral economics to political science. Annual Review of
Political Science, 14, 201-223.
Zauberman, G., Kim, B., Malkoc, S., & Bettman, J. (2008). Discounting time and time discounting:
Subjective time perception and intertemporal preferences. Journal of Marketing Research, 45, 543556. Retrieved from http://faculty.fuqua.duke.edu/~jrb12/bio/Jim/discounting time.pdf

	
  

29	
  

Figure 1: Experimental Design
Social network
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A: n=19
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B: n=21
II

Individual
Incentives

No prizes

Goals, no prizes, no group
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Figure 2: List of Goals
Goal

1

2
3
4
5
6

7

	
  

Verification
Method

Frequency

Percent
Chosen

Registration
form and
certificate of
completion

Repeatable

11.11%

Attend and complete at least ONE of
workshops in marketing and sales,
accounting, administration or
entrepreneurship offered by El Banco de las
Oportunidades or your local development
center (Cedezo)
Update or create a business plan for your
business
Begin or continue to keep accounting of your
company or business, and show the gains and
losses statement
Pay off an outstanding debt (minimum $
60,000 Colombian Pesos)
Purchase a machine, tool, or equipment for
your business (minimum $ 60,000 Colombian
Pesos)
Create and implement a marketing strategy
for your business (website, social networking
sites, etc. for those businesses that apply)

Present
documents
Present
accounting
documents
Receipt (with
date)

Once

7.24%

Repeatable

16.16%

Once per
debt

10.77%

Receipt (with
date)

Repeatable

6.06%

Present
documents/
websites

Once

9.09%

Obtain any of the following licenses or
registrations that you do not currently have
(only if required for your business): Registry
with tax board, Operation, Sanitation, Food
Handling, Public Space

Present the
application to
the enumerator
and/or group

Once for
each
registration

5.89%
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Goal
8

9

10
11
12
13
14

Participate in a job fair, exhibition, or other
business event organized by El Banco de las
Oportunidades or your local development
center (Cedezo)
Save at least $ 15,000 (Colombian pesos)
every week for next four weeks in a savings
account -- If you do not have a savings
account, we suggest you open an account in a
cooperative
Make a payment to improve your credit score
(minimum $ 60,000 Colombian Pesos)
Purchase a durable good for your home
(minimum $ 60,000 Colombian Pesos)
Apply yourself or help a member of your
family apply for at least one of the grants or
scholarships offered by the municipality for
higher education
Attend a course for adult literacy (learning to
read and write)
Join the Social Security System (Health and
Pension)

Verification
Method

Frequency

Percent
Chosen

Certificate of
participation

Repeatable

6.40%

Bank statement

Repeatable

20.20%

Repeatable

1.52%

Repeatable

4.21%

Once

0.34%

Repeatable

0.51%

Once

0.51%

Credit score
data base online
Receipt (with
date)
Present the
application
Certificate of
attendance
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certification

	
  
	
  

Figure 3: Histogram of FII Treatment Group’s Discount Rates (Endline)
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Figure 4: Present Bias – Shape of the Discount Function
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Table 1: Summary Statistics at Baseline: Treatment and Control
Treatment

Control

Obs

Mean

Std.
Dev

Min

Max

Obs

Mean

Std.
Dev

Min

Max

T-test

Discount Rate

114

1.7

1.13

-0.98

6.1

19

1.9

1.3

-0.98

4.02

-0.710

Present Bias

114

0.33

0.87

0.17

0.50

19

-0.21

1.24

-0.80

0.39

2.357

Income Strata

116

2.5

0.93

1

5

18

2.39

0.92

1

5

0.547

Education

119

2.29

1.38

0

6

19

2.63

1.21

1

5

-1.031

Gender

119

0.59

0.49

0

1

19

0.53

0.51

0

1

0.5045

Age

119

40.03

11.7

18

67

19

42.6

10.5

26

60

-0.913

	
  
	
  
	
  

Table 2: T-tests – Baseline Avg. Discount Rates by Treatment

	
  

Mean

Mean

T-stat

P-value

Goal Treatment
1.71

Control
1.89

-0.71

0.48

Incentive Treatment
1.67

Non-Incentive
1.78

0.54

0.59

Group
1.91

Non-Group
1.59

1.56

0.12

FII
2.02

Non-FII
1.65

1.49

0.14

High School or Below
1.78

Above High school
1.64

0.67

0.50

Female
1.62

Male
Mean = 1.88

-1.28

0.21

Bottom 2 Strata
1.68

3 and above
1.78

-0.51

0.62
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Table 3: T-test of Time Preferences based on Attrition
Discount Rates

Obs.

Mean

Std. Err.

T-stat

P-value

Missed meeting
Did not miss meeting

31
102

1.89
1.68

0.95
1.21

0.88

0.38

Present Bias

Obs.

Mean

Std. Err.

T-stat

P-value

Missed meeting
Did not miss meeting

31
102

0.05
0.32

0.15
0.15

1.41

0.16

	
  

# of subjects who
missed a meeting, by
treatment group

Control
6

Group2
7

Group3
5

Group4
7

	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  

Table 4: T-tests – Pooled Avg. Discount Rates by Treatment
Mean

Mean

T-stat

P-value

Goal Treatment
1.55

Control
1.91

-2.09

0.04

Incentive Treatment
1.62

Non-Incentive
1.6

0.15

0.88

Group
1.69

Non-Group
1.54

1.32

0.19

FII
1.93

Non-FII
1.52

2.86

0.005

Female
1.54

Male
1.72

-1.51

0.13

Bottom 2 Strata
1.59

3 and above
1.62

0.18

0.85
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Group5
6

Table 5: Pooled OLS – Average Discount Rate
Discount
Rate

Discount
Rate

Discount
Rate

Discount
Rate

Discount
Rate

Group

-0.004
(0.219)

0.036
(0.247)

-0.006
(0.246)

-0.015
(0.254)

-0.056
(0.248)

Incentive

-0.232
(0.221)

-0.211
(0.219)

-0.166
(0.209)

-0.174
(0.211)

-0.227
(0.203)

Goal

-0.441*
(0.245)

-0.438*
(0.252)

-0.479*
(0.245)

-0.466*
(0.248)

-0.405
(0.245)

FII

0.657**
(0.313)

0.621*
(0.328)

0.652*
(0.333)

0.655*
(0.335)

0.750**
(0.316)

0.005
(0.096)

0.072
(0.092)

0.072
(0.092)

0.043
(0.088)

-0.109
(0.083)

-0.108
(0.083)

-0.044
(0.087)

-0.041
(0.156)

-0.014
(0.157)

VARIABLES

Income strata

Education

Gender
female=1

Age

Constant

Observations
R-squared

0.017**
(0.007)
1.978***
(0.226)

1.966***
(0.324)

2.070***
(0.344)

2.082***
(0.361)

1.285**
(0.537)

356
0.063

345
0.061

345
0.073

345
0.073

345
0.096

Clustered (individual level) standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: All regressions include time and meeting location dummy variables
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Table 6: OLS Regressions by Time Period – Average Discount Rate
Baseline

Mid-Point

Discount
Rate

Discount
Rate

Discount
Rate

Discount
Rate

Discount
Rate

Discount
Rate

Group

0.183
(0.307)

0.196
(0.325)

-0.091
(0.327)

-0.142
(0.349)

-0.124
(0.297)

-0.242
(0.327)

Incentive

-0.322
(0.308)

-0.334
(0.284)

-0.154
(0.343)

-0.125
(0.302)

-0.189
(0.310)

-0.132
(0.280)

Goal

-0.299
(0.349)

-0.119
(0.322)

-0.650*
(0.370)

-0.692*
(0.354)

-0.386
(0.348)

-0.452
(0.315)

FII

0.541
(0.431)

0.521
(0.435)

0.623
(0.458)

0.708
(0.438)

0.809*
(0.421)

0.952**
(0.423)

VARIABLES

Income strata

-0.056
(0.109)

0.111
(0.152)

0.093
(0.111)

Education

0.132
(0.124)

-0.118
(0.099)

-0.204*
(0.113)

Gender

-0.125
(0.224)

-0.019
(0.240)

0.177
(0.195)

0.021*
(0.010)

0.011
(0.010)

0.017*
(0.009)

female=1

Age

Constant

Observations
R-squared

2.013***
(0.285)

0.918
(0.708)

2.124***
(0.300)

1.679**
(0.695)

1.908***
(0.292)

1.445**
(0.633)

133
0.051

133
0.094

113
0.072

113
0.107

110
0.074

110
0.184

Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: All regressions include a meeting location dummy variable

	
  
	
  
	
  

	
  

Endline

36	
  

Table 7: Pooled Linear Probability Model – Patience Dummy Variable
Patience
Dummy

Patience
Dummy

Patience
Dummy

Patience
Dummy

Patience
Dummy

Group

-0.047
(0.053)

-0.064
(0.054)

-0.054
(0.054)

-0.058
(0.053)

-0.055
(0.054)

Incentive

-0.051
(0.059)

-0.053
(0.062)

-0.064
(0.064)

-0.067
(0.063)

-0.063
(0.065)

Goal

0.108*
(0.055)

0.127**
(0.058)

0.139**
(0.056)

0.145**
(0.057)

0.141**
(0.058)

FII

0.070
(0.077)

0.085
(0.078)

0.079
(0.077)

0.080
(0.076)

0.073
(0.080)

0.000
(0.019)

-0.017
(0.018)

-0.017
(0.018)

-0.015
(0.018)

0.027*
(0.015)

0.028*
(0.016)

0.023
(0.018)

-0.018
(0.036)

-0.019
(0.037)

VARIABLES

Income strata

Education

Gender
female=1

Age

Constant

Observations
R-squared

-0.001
(0.002)
0.393***
(0.064)

0.367***
(0.079)

0.339***
(0.082)

0.344***
(0.083)

0.398***
(0.128)

371
0.231

360
0.228

360
0.232

360
0.232

360
0.233

Clustered (individual level) standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: All regressions include time and meeting location dummy variables

	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  

37	
  

Table 8: Pooled T-tests of Present-Bias by Treatment
Mean

Mean

T-stat

P-value

Goal Treatment
0.56

Control
-0.03

3.73

0.00

Incentive Treatment
0.44

Non-Incentive
0.50

-0.46

0.64

Group Treatment
0.49

Non-Group
0.46

0.28

0.78

FII
0.23

Non-FII
0.54

-2.31

0.02

	
  
	
  
	
  

Table 9: Pooled OLS – Present Bias
Present
Bias

Present
Bias

Present
Bias

Present
Bias

Present
Bias

Group

0.121
(0.184)

0.040
(0.199)

0.054
(0.203)

0.057
(0.203)

0.047
(0.201)

Incentive

0.064
(0.197)

0.100
(0.204)

0.084
(0.202)

0.087
(0.208)

0.076
(0.202)

Goal

0.645**
(0.276)

0.650**
(0.289)

0.665**
(0.293)

0.660**
(0.299)

0.674**
(0.303)

FII

-0.576**
(0.258)

-0.530*
(0.270)

-0.541**
(0.272)

-0.542**
(0.273)

-0.520*
(0.268)

-0.111
(0.071)

-0.134*
(0.076)

-0.134*
(0.077)

-0.141*
(0.077)

0.038
(0.055)

0.038
(0.055)

0.052
(0.061)

0.014
(0.135)

0.019
(0.136)

VARIABLES

Income strata

Education

Gender
female=1
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0.004
(0.006)

Age

Constant

Observations
R-squared

0.146
(0.266)

0.402
(0.321)

0.365
(0.331)

0.361
(0.334)

0.190
(0.500)

354
0.096

343
0.093

343
0.095

343
0.095

343
0.096

Clustered (individual level) standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: All regressions include time and meeting location dummy variables
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